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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTMATES

1 February 1951 (As revised by IAC Reps)

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA (Draft No. 2)

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its European satellites with respect to action against Yugoslavia during 1951.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

STATE

- I. SOVIET OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO YUGOSLAVIA
- II. HOW STRONG AND HOW STABLE IS TITO'S REGINE AT PRESENT?

STATE

A. Is the regime politically stable? Are the internal security forces dependable? Is there any significant popular discontent? Are any organized groups opposing the government?

STATE

B. What are the main economic weaknesses of Yugoslavia, and how serious an effect do they have on the stability of the regime?

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C. How far does the stability of Tito's regime depend upon economic assistance from the West?

ARMY

D. Military vulnerability.

Military

WHAT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SUBVERSIVE PRESSURES ARE THE USSR AND SATELLITES LIKELY TO APPLY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA DURING 1951, AND WITH WHAT SUCCESS?

A. What are Soviet and Satellite capabilities for applying such pressures?

STATE

B. Which of these measures are they likely in fact to take?

ARMY

C. Are these courses of action likely to bring about the downfall of the Tito regime?

CAN THE USSR AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES DESTROY THE TITO REGIME BY INVASION DURING 1951?

(1) overrunning Yugoslavia; (2)

A. What are the capabilities of the USSR/for destroying the

Tito regime by invading Yugoslavia?

ARMY

DIIA

what are the capabilities of satellite armed forces for destroying the Tito regime by invasion, without direct participation by armed forces of the USSR?

SERVICES

- What total military forces can the East European satellites probably bring to bear against Yugoslavia in 1951?
- What are the fighting capabilities of the satellite armed forces that could be brought to bear against Yugoslavia in 1951.

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- G. What are Tugoslav military capabilities for resisting invasion?
 - I. What is the strength and combat efficiency of the Yugoslav armed forces?
 - 2. How are the capabilities of the Yugoslav armed forces
 likely to develop during 1951? How far is such development dependent on assistance from the West?
 - 3. Can the Yugoslaw armed forces successfully oppose an invasion?
 - 4. To what extent would military aid from the West be a critical factor in Yngoslav resistance?

V. IS DIRECT MILITARY ATTACK UPON YIGOSLAVIA BY THE USSR OR BY ITS SATTLETES LUCELY DURING 1951?

STATE AND ARMY

A. What are the indications for and against the likelihood of such an attack?

STATE AND ARMY

B. What reasons are likely to impel the USSR to make such an attack in the near future (1951) (or to direct its satellites to make it), and what reasons will argue against it?

C. Is armed attack upon Yugoslavia probable during 1951

1. By the USSR?

STATE AND ARMX

- 2. By the satellites, without direct participation of USSR armed forces?
- 3. By the satellites, supported if necessary by overt and direct USSR intervention?